

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00428 01 OF 04 211538Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03
NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 NRC-05 /090 W
-----018364 211652Z /46

O 211432Z JUL 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2307
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY ANKARA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK BY POUCH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0428

FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO

BELGRADE ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE-ALL OTHER MBFR MISSIONS TAKE AS ROUTINE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00428 01 OF 04 211538Z

AT ITS JULY 21 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED IN GENERAL
TERMS THE OUTLINE TO BE USED BY NETHERLANDS REP (DEVOS) IN
MAKING REGULAR AHG ORAL REPORT TO THE NAC JULY 22. DEVOS WILL
BE ASSISTED BY CANADIAN REP (COX) AND TURKISH REP (INHAN).
NETHERLANDS REP WILL DRAW ON MATERIAL IN THE OUTLINE, NOT
NECESSARILY USING IT IN FULL. UNLIKE WRITTEN REPORTS TO THE NAC,

THE AD HOC GROUP DOES NOT UNDERTAKE WORD-FOR-WORD APPROVAL OF THESE OUTLINES, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED AS SPEAKING NOTES. THE TEXT OF NETHERLANDS REP'S REPORT FOLLOWS BELOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. MY REPORT TODAY ON THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR COVERS DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST AHG ORAL REPORT TO NAC ON JUNE 17, 1977 THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF THE 12TH ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS YESTERDAY, JULY 21, 1977.

2. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT DURING THIS PERIOD WAS THE TABLING, IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JULY 15, OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR DATA DISAGGREGATION WHICH THE COUNCIL APPROVED ON JULY 12.

3. IN THEIR INITIAL REACTION EASTERN REPS STATED THAT THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE STUDIED WITH DUE ATTENTION. THE CRITERION TO BE APPLIED IN THE EASTERN APPRAISAL WOULD BE WHETHER THIS PROPOSAL, OR AT LEAST SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS, COULD BE USED FOR MOVING THE DATA DISCUSSION FORWARD AND IN PARTICULAR FOR CLARIFYING THE REASONS FOR THE UNJUSTIFIABLY OVER-STATED WESTERN ESTIMATES OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME, EASTERN REPS STATED, THEIR PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE AND DISCUSS DATA ON NATIONAL FORCE STRENGTHS REMAINED ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND WOULD, ACCORDING TO THEIR CONVICTION MAKE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00428 01 OF 04 211538Z

POSSIBLE RAPID AND COMPLETE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ERRORS MADE BY THE WEST IN ESTIMATING WP FORCE STRENGTH, WHILE ALSO PERMITTING CLARIFICATION OF DISCREPANCIES EXISTING BETWEEN WESTERN OFFICIAL DATA ON THE FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND EASTERN ESTIMATES OF THE STRENGTH OF THOSE FORCES.

4. WHEN THE SUBJECT WAS AGAIN DISCUSSED IN THE FINAL INFORMAL SESSION OF THE ROUND ON JULY 19, EASTERN COMMENTS, ALTHOUGH STILL BEING TERMED AS BEING OF A PRELIMINARY CHARACTER, WERE MARKEDLY NEGATIVE. IT WAS CLAIMED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS GOING FURTHER INTO DETAIL THAN IS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF REDUCTIONS, THAT THE EXAMINATION OF SUCH DETAILS WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE AND PROLONG THE DISCUSSION, THAT DETAILS OF MILITARY ORGANISATION WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCLOSED WITHOUT GUARANTEE THAT THE WEST WOULD GIVE UP ITS ERRONEOUS ESTIMATES, AND THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO TURN THE DATA DISCUSSION INTO A DISCUSSION ON ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, EASTERN REPS FIRMLY RESTATED THEIR OWN POSITION ON THE NEED TO PROVIDE NATIONAL BREAKDOWNS AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR BRINGING THE DATA DISCUSSION FORWARD. EASTERN REPS PROMISED TO PRESENT MORE DEFINITIVE VIEWS ON THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOLLOWING THE RECESS, AFTER CONSULTATION IN THEIR CAPITALS.

5. IT IS OF COURSE NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS MOMENT TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER THE EAST WILL EVENTUALLY GIVE UP ITS INSISTENCE ON THE EXCHANGE OF NATIONAL TOTALS, WHICH IT CONSIDERS A LOGICAL NEXT STEP IN THE PROCESS OF DATA CLARIFICATION. UP TO NOW EASTERN REPS HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR NATIONAL BREAKDOWNS, REITERATING THAT THIS WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE NEGOTIATING POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. THEY HAVE INDICATED, THAT THE TABLING OF NATIONAL FORCE TOTALS, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SEPARATE FIGURES FOR GROUND FORCE AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER, COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS OF BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN REPS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE MANNING LEVELS OF EASTERN FORCES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY OVER-ESTIMATED BY THE WEST AND THAT THIS IS ONE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00428 01 OF 04 211538Z

OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES ON WP FORCES IN THE AREA.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00428 02 OF 04 211612Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03
NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 PRS-01 SP-02
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O 211432Z JUL 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2308

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY ANKARA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK BY POUCH

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0428

FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO

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6. THE EAST HAS CONTINUED TO ASSERT THAT THE OFFICIAL DATA
SUBMITTED BY EACH SIDE OF ITS MILITARY MANPOWER HAS DEMONSTRATED
THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE MANPOWER PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE,
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00428 02 OF 04 211612Z

JUSTIFYING THE EASTERN APPROACH OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS.
EASTERN REPS ACCUSED THE WEST OF BLOCKING THE NEGOTIATIONS BY
HOLDING ON TO ITS ARTIFICIAL CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES WITHOUT
PROVIDING ANY PROOF OF ITS CONTENTIONS OF EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN
MILITARY MANPOWER. THEY HAVE ALSO STATED THAT THE FACT THAT THE
WEST HAS NOT SO FAR SUBMITTED THE CONCRETE FIGURES OF ITS UPDATED
ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES HAS CONFIRMED THE EASTERN
IMPRESSION THAT THE WESTERN ESTIMATES ARE UNRELIABLE. THEY
HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST IS KEEPING THESE ESTIMATES INDEFINITE
IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING THEM AT ANY MOMENT
AT ITS OWN DISCRETION IN ORDER TO SUPPORT ITS CASE. (OESER
IN INFORMAL OF JUNE 21, 1977).

7. IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DATA
DISAGGREGATION, THERE WAS SOME FURTHER EXCHANGE IN INFORMAL
SESSIONS OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON COUNTING RULES EMPLOYED BY
EITHER SIDE IN THE COMPILATION OF AGGREGATE FIGURES, THE FOCUS
BEING ON WHAT SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN INCLUDED
OR EXCLUDED FROM THESE TOTALS. AS BEFORE, THIS HAS SHED NO LIGHT
ON THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN
DATA ON WP MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE EAST HAS
SHOWN DECREASING ENTHUSIASM FOR CONTINUING THIS KIND OF
EXCHANGE. ALREADY BEFORE THE PRESENTATION OF THE NEW WESTERN DATA
BREAKDOWN PROPOSAL, THE EAST HAS BEEN ALLEGING THAT THE ATTITUDE
OF WESTERN REPS TENDED TO LEAD THE NEGOTIATIONS AWAY FROM THE
REDUCTION ISSUE, AND HAS ASKED FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE
CONDITION THAT THE DATA DISCUSSION SHOULD REMAIN LIMITED TO
QUESTIONS WHICH ARE MEANINGFUL FOR THE SOLUTION OF REDUCTION
PROBLEMS AND SHOULD NOT PASS OVER TO THE ISSUE OF THE
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF PARTICIPANTS.

8. CONCERNING THE CATEGORISATION OF MILITARY MANPOWER BETWEEN
GROUND AND AIRFORCES THE EAST, IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00428 02 OF 04 211612Z

JULY 15, REPLYING TO WESTERN QUESTIONS, THE SOVIET CONFIRMED THAT
THE EAST IN COMPILING ITS OWN DATA HAS ALLOCATED THE THREE
CATEGORIES CONCERNED-POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORIAL AIR
DEFENCE PERSONNEL, FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL AND THE PERSONNEL OF
HELICOPTER UNITS-ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT FOR BOTH
SIDES SIMILAR FORCES MUST BE ALLOCATED TO ONE AND THE SAME ARMED
SERVICE. THE COUNCIL WILL REMEMBER THAT IN ITS MESSAGE OF
DECEMBER 16, 1976 THE AHG REQUESTED IT TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF
HOW TO DEAL WITH THESE THREE IDENTIFIED ANOMALIES IN THE PRESENT
WESTERN CATEGORISATION OF MILITARY MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR.

9. AS BEFORE, DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT GENERAL
ISSUES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE DISCUSSED IN PARALLEL WITH DATA.

10. MAIN THEMES STRESSED BY EASTERN REPS WERE A) THE ALLEGED LACK
OF CONFORMITY OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WITH WHAT THE
EAST CLAIMS TO BE A SET OF PRINCIPLES AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY
TALKS,
B) THE NEED FOR NON US/SU DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO ASSUME
IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT CLEAR OBLIGATIONS AS REGARDS SCOPE AND
TIMING OF THEIR PHASE II REDUCTIONS,
C) THE NEED TO INCLUDE AIRFORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE
REDUCTION PROCESS,
D) CRITICISM OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF
A SOVIET TANK ARMY,
E) CRITICISM OF THE WESTERN COLLECTIVE CEILING CONCEPT AND
F) THE MERITS OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL.

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00428 03 OF 04 220238Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 NSC-05 NRC-05 /084 W
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O 211432Z JUL 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2309
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERN
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AMEMBASSY ANKARA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK BY POUCH

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0428

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING 3 LINES TO PARA 14 AT END
AND ADDING PARA 15.)

FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO
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11. AS REGARDS THE PRECISE NATURE AND EXTEND OF PHASE I
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00428 03 OF 04 220238Z

COMMITMENTS BY NON US/SU DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EASTERN REPS,
IN REPLY TO WESTERN QUESTIONS ON THIS POINT, AS BEFORE WERE
AMBIGUOUS. BASICALLY, THEIR POSITION SEEMS TO REMAIN THAT ALL
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALREADY IN A PHSE I AGREEMENT IN ONE
FORM OR ANOTHER HAVE TO SIGN ON TO ALL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE
EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, I.E. EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF
BOTH GROUND AND AIRFORCES, ACCORDING TO A FIXED TIMETABLE AND
TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY UNITS INCLUDING THEIR ARMAMENTS, RESULTING
IN NATIONAL FORCE CEILINGS. HOWEVER, PRESUMABLY IN AN EFFORT TO
ENGAGE THE WEST IN NEGOTIATION ON THE BASIS OF THEIR FEBRUARY 1976
PROPOSAL, EASTERN REPS STILL SEEM INTENT ON CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION
THAT, PROVIDED "SCOPE" AND "TIMING" CAN BE ADEQUATELY SPECIFIED
IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE RESOLUTION
OF SOME OF THE OTHER ISSUES MIGHT BE DEFERRED TO THE ELABORATION
OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT, MIGHT BE A NEGOTIABLE ONE.

12. REGARDING THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL
OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IN THE

INFORMAL SESSION OF JULY 15 REITERATED ITS COMPLETE UNACCEPTABILITY TO THE EAST. IN THIS CONNECTION HE ONCE AGAIN ASSAILED THE INCONSISTENT WESTERN APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS WHICH CLAIMED TO BE "SELECTIVE" BUT, AS REGARDS THE SOVIET UNION, SEEMED TO REQUIRE REDUCTION AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION OF PRACTICALLY ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS AT THE DISPOSAL OF ITS GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SUCH AN APPROACH, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT OTHER NATO PARTICIPANTS REFUSED TO REDUCE AND LIMIT ANY ARMS AT ALL, COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A SERIOUS ONE. TARASOV SPECIALLY REQUESTED THE WEST TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION IN CASE THE EAST HAD NOT CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS MATTER. I MAY ONCE AGAIN REMIND THE COUNCIL OF THE AHG'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY OTHER THAN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00428 03 OF 04 220238Z

13. ON THE ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE IN BILATERAL CONVERSATION REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC FOR THE WEST TO COMBINE THIS CONCEPT WITH A SUBCEILING ON SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA. IT IS OF COURSE TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER SUCH STATEMENTS, COMBINED WITH SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS FORMULATIONS EMPLOYED IN RECENT EASTERN STATEMENTS DEALING WITH THIS SUBJECT IN BOTH INFORMAL AND PLENARY SESSION, ARE INTENDED ONLY TO GAUGE WESTERN REACTION TO VARIOUS OPTIONS OR ARE ALREADY MEANT TO CONVEY POTENTIAL FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION.

14. ALSO ON THE QUESTION OF THE NATURE OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LIMITATIONS, THE POLISH REPRESENTATIVE, IN THE PLENARY SESSION OF JUNE 30, STATED EASTERN CONVICTION THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS -WITHOUT RESORTING TO THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS- FOR A SITUATION WHERE ANY OF THE PARTIES MIGHT IN THE FUTURE UNDERTAKE A UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD IN MIND SOLUTIONS WHICH, BY PRESERVING THE FORCE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE AREA, WOULD NOT INFRINGE UPON THE SECURITY INTEREST OF THE PARTIES TO AN AGREEMENT. IN BILATERAL CONVERSATION POLISH REPRESENTATIVES HAVE IN THE PAST AT VARIOUS TIMES SUGGESTED THAT IN CASE OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BY ONE SIDE, CONSULTATIONS MIGHT BE ENVISAGED WITH A VIEW TO AGREEING ON MATCHING REDUCTIONS BY THE OTHER SIDE.

15. WELCOMING THE AFOREMENTIONED POLISH STATEMENT AS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NEED FOR AN ACCEPTABLE AND ADEQUATE SOLUTION FOR THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE AGAIN EXPLAINED THE REASONS WHY THEY CONSIDER A COMBINATION OF AN OVERALL COLLECTIVE CEILING

WITH A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON THE MANPOWER OF THE TWO
MAJOR MILITARY POWERS IN THE AREA THE ONLY REALISTIC AND
EQUITABLE WAY OF HANDLING THE ISSUE OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS
SECRET

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00428 03 OF 04 220238Z

IN AN AGREEMENT.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00428 04 OF 04 211643Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03
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SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 NRC-05 /084 W
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O 211432Z JUL 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2310

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0428

FROM US REP MBFR

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16. THE ALREADY MENTIONED POLISH STATEMENT OF JUNE 30
WAS MAINLY DEVOTED TO ADVOCATING ONCE MORE THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00428 04 OF 04 211643Z

MERITS OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. AS REGARDS THE
NATURE OF SUCH A NON-INCREASE LIMITATION, AGAIN CERTAIN
AMBIGUOUS FORMULATIONS MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO CONFEY THE
IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS SOME ROOM FOR THE POSSIBILITY
THAT IT MIGHT BECOME A COLLECTIVE LIMITATION FOR BOTH SIDES.

17. THE WEST FOR ITS PART HAS CONTINUED TO DEFEND
THE CENTRAL FEATURES OF ITS REDUCTION APPROACH AND TO
PRESS FOR AN ADEQUATE EASTERN RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS OF
DECEMBER 1975, REJECTING THE NOTION THAT THE EASTERN
FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL CONSTITUTED SUCH A RESPONSE. WE
HAVE CONTINUED TO CRITICISE THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH
FOR ITS INCONSISTENCE WITH THE AGREED OBJECTIVE OF ENHANCING
STABILITY AND WITH THE ALSO AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY, ONE OF THE REASONS BEING THAT IT
IGNORES THE IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHY ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
WE HAVE REFUTED UNWARRANTED EASTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
COMMUNIQUE ON THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

18. FINALLY, WE HAVE MADE ANOTHER EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE EAST
IN A DISCUSSION ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES, REMINDING EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE
FOR STABILIZING MEASURES TO BE INCLUDED IN A FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT, AND OF THE NEED FOR TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THIS
ISSUE IN ORDER TO AVOID UNDESIRABLE DEALYS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
AT A LATER STAGE. LIKE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS,
HOWEVER, THE EASTERN SIDE RESPONDED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE
TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC NOW SINCE THE CHARACTER OF ASSOCIATED
MEASURES SHOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT
AND FRUITFUL DISCUSSION COULD THEREFORE NOT BEGIN UNTIL THERE
WAS AGREEMENT ON THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF REDUCTIONS.
EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ALSO CRITICISED WESTERN PROPOSALS ON
STABILIZING MEASURES FOR NOT APPLYING TO ALL PARTICIPANTS, BUT
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00428 04 OF 04 211643Z

ONLY TO THE US AND USSR, AND FOR OMITTING COVERAGE OF AIR
FORCES. NEITHERDID THEY AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE EXCEPTIONS
FROM AGREED CEILINGS TO PERMIT ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL
TO ENTER THE AREA FOR EXERCISES AND ROTATION AS THE WEST

HAS PROPOSED. THEY INSISTED THAT ONCE AGREED MANPOWER CEILINGS ENTERED INTO EFFECT FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS, PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO ADHERE TO THEM STRICTLY.

19. MOST URGENT BUSINESS IN THE NEXT ROUND WILL OF COURSE BE TO PRESS FOR A MORE POSITIVE EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN DATA DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL. THE AHG CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT EFFECTIVE SUPPORT OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS REQUIRES US TO BE IN A POSITION OF CHALLENGING IN A CREDIBLE MANNER EASTERN DATA PURPORTING TO DEMONSTRATE AN ALREADY EXISTING APPROXIMATE PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA, AND THAT FOR THIS IT IS NECESSARY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO INSIST ON A DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF THESE FIGURES.
END TEXT.RESOR

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Message Attributes

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TAGS: PARM, NATO, NAC, MBFR
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Declassified/Released
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